This paper presents four different contexts in which students practiced implementing business ethics. Students were required to develop Codes of Conduct/Codes of Ethics as a classroom exercise. By developing these codes, students can improve their understanding of how and why codes of conduct are developed, designed, and implemented in the workplace. Using the three-phase content analysis process (McCabe et al.: 1999, The Journal of Higher Education 70(2), 211–234), we identify a framework consisting of 10 classifications that can be used to (...) assess learning outcomes in embedded ethics education. By analyzing the different content within each classification, instructors were able to gain a better understanding of differing application of ethical principles. This analysis indicates that there needs to be more research on codes of conduct for smaller units within an organization and more integration of work group codes of conduct into the business curriculum. (shrink)

Can the institutional systems that prepare Black nurse researchers question the ways their systemic pathways have impacted health equity knowledge development in nursing? We invite our readers to keep this question in mind and engage with our conversation as Black nurse researchers, scholars, educators, and clinicians. The purpose of our conversation, and this article, is to explore the transactional impact of knowledge development pathways and Black faculty retention pathways on the state of health equity knowledge in nursing today. Over a (...) series of conversations, we discuss the research exploitation of communities of color, deficit research funding, knowledge capitalization, the marginalization of diversity as a continuous process, a lack of sociocultural authority, and our thoughts on solutions. We conclude by using the wisdom of a generation to answer our initial question. (shrink)

Recent philosophical criticisms of individual rights and the postmodern deconstruction of the sovereign subject raise serious questions for the defense of universal human rights. This paper critically examines Paul Ricoeur's effort to reconstruct a viable notion of the human subject as the bearer of human rights. Ricoeur's analysis of the narrative structure of human experiences and action takes account of the recent philosophical criticisms of sovereign subjectivity; it avoids both the fiction of the atomistic individual of liberal political philosophy and (...) the fragility of a completely relativized and decentered subject. By extending Ricoeur's work on narrative identity and by developing a humanism based on the ethical primacy of the other-than-self, this paper aims to provide new insights into the complexity of implementing and defending universal human rights. Key Words: deconstruction • human rights • narrative • Ricoeur • subject • subjectivity. (shrink)

At several points in his writings, Levinas is implicitly critical of Hobbes's view that the political order is required to restrict violent conflict and competition and make morality possible. This paper makes Levinas's criticisms explicit by comparing Hobbes's descriptions of human nature and human relations with Levinas's radically different descriptions of the ethical relation of responsibility and the consequent kinship of the human community. I use insights from Levinas to argue that ethics cannot be reduced to politics and that the (...) primacy of the ethical relation provides a more adequate description of human relations and justice in the human community. (shrink)

We extend the relational algebra of Chin and Tarski so that it is multisorted or, as we prefer, typed. Each type supports a local Boolean algebra outfitted with a converse operator. From Lyndon, we know that relation algebras cannot be represented as proper relation algebras where a proper relation algebra has binary relations as elements and the algebra is singly-typed. Here, the intensional conjunction, which was to represent relational composition in Chin and Tarski, spans three different local algebras, thus the (...) term distributed in the title. Since we do not rely on proper relation algebras, we are free to re-express the algebras as typed. In doing so, we allow many different intensional conjunction operators. We construct a typed logic over these algebras, also known as heterogeneous algebras of Birkhoff and Lipson. The logic can be seen as a form of relevance logic with a classical negation connective where the Routley-Meyer star operator is reified as a converse connective in the logic. Relevance logic itself is not typed but our work shows how it can be made so. Some of the properties of classical relevance logic are weakened from Routley-Meyer’s version which is too strong for a logic over relation algebras. (shrink)

This collection of papers by prominent feminist thinkers advances the positive feminist project of remapping the moral by developing theory that acknowledges the diversity of women.

IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO ASSUME that Hegel's comments about the law of identity form a consistent package. On the one hand, Hegel admits that the law of identity, which he expresses in words as.

This study examined the role of temporal orientation and affective frame in the execution of ethical decision-making strategies. In reflecting on a past experience or imagining a future experience, participants thought about experiences that they considered either positive or negative. The participants recorded their thinking about that experience by responding to several questions, and their responses were content-analyzed for the use of ethical decision-making strategies. The findings indicated that a future temporal orientation was associated with greater strategy use. Likewise, a (...) positive affective frame was associated with greater strategy use. Future orientation may permit better strategy execution than a past orientation because it facilitates more objective, balanced contemplation of the reflected-upon situation and minimizes potential self-threat associated with past behavior. A positive affective frame likely improves strategy execution because it facilitates active analysis of the experience. Future directions and implications of these findings are discussed. (shrink)

In an attempt to revive discussion of the argument from illusion this paper amends the classic version of the argument to avoid Austin's main objection. It then develops and defends a version of the intentional object reply to the argument, arguing that an "unendorsed story" account of reports of dreams and hallucinations avoids commitment to nonexistent objects.

This project examined the ethical issues faced by academics and professionals in the Humanities. We conducted focus groups to gather information about the ethical concerns in these fields and used the qualitative data arising from the discussions to create a taxonomy that represents the structure of ethical issues in the Humanities. A key implication of our findings is that while the focus of ethics research and interventions has been primarily on the sciences and engineering, academics and professionals in other fields (...) also encounter some unique critical ethical dilemmas that require further research and methods of intervention. (shrink)

Abstract: Hilary Putnam has reformulated his model-theoretic argument as an argument against indirect realism in the philosophy of perception. This new argument is reviewed and defended. Putnam’s new focus on philosophical theories of perception (instead of metaphysical realism) makes better sense of his previous responses to the objection from the causal theory of reference. It is argued that the model-theoretic argument can also be construed as an argument that holders of a causal theory of reference should adopt direct realism in (...) the philosophy of perception. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has raised a host of ethical challenges, but key among these has been the possibility that health care systems might need to ration scarce critical care resources. Rationing p...

An unlinked seroprevalence study of HIV and other viruses was conducted on pregnant women on the Caribbean island of Grenada in 1994. Investigators were from both the developed world and the Grenadian Ministry of Health . There was then no board on Grenada to protect research subjects or review ethical aspects of studies. Nurses from the MOH were asked to verbally inform their patients about the study, and request that patients become subjects of the study and give blood for screening. (...) If consent was given nurses took blood and administered a survey about each subjects' knowledge of HIV transmission routes. Nurses shared a spoken dialect and cultural heritage with prospective subjects and were probably more effective than foreign researchers at informing subjects. Informed consent was obtained with a simplified consent form supplemented by conversation with each prospective research subject. Facilitating discussion between people with common cultural backgrounds helps apply the Western approach to informed consent to communities in the developing world. Researchers must disclose all information to nurses or other mediators, and ensure that nurses disclose as much information as possible to prospective subjects. So modified, informed consent maintains respect for persons and becomes applicable and relevant to various cultures. (shrink)

An unlinked seroprevalence study of HIV and other viruses was conducted on pregnant women on the Caribbean island of Grenada in 1994. Investigators were from both the developed world and the Grenadian Ministry of Health . There was then no board on Grenada to protect research subjects or review ethical aspects of studies. Nurses from the MOH were asked to verbally inform their patients about the study, and request that patients become subjects of the study and give blood for screening. (...) If consent was given nurses took blood and administered a survey about each subjects' knowledge of HIV transmission routes. Nurses shared a spoken dialect and cultural heritage with prospective subjects and were probably more effective than foreign researchers at informing subjects. Informed consent was obtained with a simplified consent form supplemented by conversation with each prospective research subject. Facilitating discussion between people with common cultural backgrounds helps apply the Western approach to informed consent to communities in the developing world. Researchers must disclose all information to nurses or other mediators, and ensure that nurses disclose as much information as possible to prospective subjects. So modified, informed consent maintains respect for persons and becomes applicable and relevant to various cultures. (shrink)

This study examined the role of reflection on personal cases for making ethical decisions with regard to new ethical problems. Participants assumed the position of a business manager in a hypothetical organization and solved ethical problems that might be encountered. Prior to making a decision for the business problems, participants reflected on a relevant ethical experience. The findings revealed that application of material garnered from reflection on a personal experience was associated with decisions of higher ethicality. However, whether the case (...) was viewed as positive or negative, and whether the outcomes, processes, or outcomes and processes embedded in the experience were examined, influenced the application of case material to the new problem. As expected, examining positive experiences and the processes involved in those positive experiences resulted in greater application of case material to new problems. Future directions and implications for understanding ethical decision making are discussed. (shrink)

Mental health professionals rightfully experience significant anxiety regarding their duty to protect when working with potentially dangerous individuals. This work dispels myths and provides readers with a resource addressing the situations where a duty to protect may apply.

Various considerations are adduced toshow that we require that a testifier know hertestimony. Such a requirement apparentlyimproves testimony. It is argued that the aimof improving testimony explains why we have anduse our concept of knowledge. If we were tointroduce a term of praise for testimony, usingit at first to praise testimony that apparentlyhelped us in our practical projects, it wouldcome to be used as we now use the word``know''.

Adequate epistemic justification is best conceived as the appearance, over time, of knowledge to the subject. ‘Appearance’ is intended literally, not as a synonym for belief. It is argued through consideration of examples that this account gets the extension of ‘adequately justified belief’ at least roughly correct. A more theoretical reason is then offered to regard justification as the appearance of knowledge: If we have a knowledge norm for assertion, we do our best to comply with this norm when we (...) express as assertions only beliefs that appear to us to be knowledge. If we are doing our best, there is little point in further sanctions. So a norm of knowledge for assertion would lead to a secondary norm of justified belief as the appearance of knowledge, marking a point at which our assertions may be corrected but should not be blamed. (shrink)

Non-propositional experiences can help justify beliefs, contrary to recent claims made by Donald Davidson and Laurence Bonjour. It is argued that a perceptual belief is justified if there are no undermining beliefs and it was arrived at in response to an experience through an adequate exercise of properly learned recognitional skills.

Imagining that I am Napoleon is not (normally) imagining an impossibility. It is (or at least may be) just adopting a first person way of imagining Napoleon. The images and bits of narrative using 'I' are intended to refer to Napoleon and his surroundings, in something like the way that a salt shaker can stand for a regiment of troops when the general says "This is the third regiment' while explaining his plans at the breakfast table.

This paper discusses Plato’s question from the Meno : Why should we prefer knowledge that p over mere true belief that p? I find I just do prefer knowledge, and not for any further benefit that I am aware of in the particular case. But I should have that preference, because given our practice of approving of testimony only if uttered with knowledge, I could fail to prefer knowledge, when other things seem to me to be equal, only by having (...) the sorts of serious social or psychological defects that would make me unresponsive to the approval of others. Finally, the social practice that produces this particular preference is good for all of us because it improves the average quality of the testimony we receive, which results in greater success in our projects. (shrink)

This paper attempts to give an experiential explanation of the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification in some of our judgments about ourselves. The main idea is that in most of these judgments we respond to the type of presentation -- e.g., proprioceptive -- and not to presented properties of the perceived object.

A recent account of the meaning of 'real' leads to a view of what anti-realism should be that resembles fictionalism, while not being committed to fictionalism as such or being subject to some of the more obvious objections to that view. This account of anti-realism explains how we might 'make up' what is true in areas such as mathematics or ethics, and yet these made-up truths are resistant to alterations, even by our collective decisions. Finally it is argued that the (...) sort of anti-realism suggested explains the appearance that the ethical domain supervenes on the naturalistic. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 7, Page 21-23, July 2012.

This chapter contains sections titled: References.

Control of our own beliefs is allegedly required for the truth of epistemic evaluations, such as S ought to believe that p , or S ought to suspend judgment (and so refrain from any belief) whether p . However, we cannot usually believe or refrain from believing at will. I agree with a number of recent authors in thinking that this apparent conflict is to be resolved by distinguishing reasons for believing that give evidence that p from reasons that make (...) it desirable to believe that p whether or not p is true. I argue however that there is a different problem, one that becomes clearer in light of this solution to the first problem. Someone’s approval of our beliefs is at least often a non-evidential reason to believe, and as such cannot change our beliefs. Ought judgments aim to change the world. But ‘ought to believe’ judgments can’t do that by changing the belief, if they don’t give evidence. So I argue that we should instead regard epistemic ought judgments as aimed mainly at influencing assertions that express the belief and other actions based on the belief, in accord with recent philosophical claims that we have epistemic norms for assertion and action. (shrink)

A traditional diagnosis of the error in the Cartesian skeptical arguments holds that they exploit our tendencies to take a representationalist view of perception. Thinking (perhaps not too clearly) that we perceive only our own sensory states, it seems to us that our perceptual beliefs about physical objects must be justified qua explanations of those sensory states. Such justification requires us to have reasons to reject rival explanations, such as the skeptical hypotheses, which we lack. However, those who adopt the (...) direct realist view of perception still find these arguments plausible, although, according to this diagnosis, they shouldn't. To avoid this objection, I argue that the Cartesian skeptical arguments exploit, not our representationalist tendencies, but our habits for evaluating causal explanatory justifications. (shrink)

A traditional diagnosis of the error in the Cartesian skeptical arguments holds that they exploit our tendencies to take a representationalist view of perception. Thinking (perhaps not too clearly) that we perceive only our own sensory states, it seems to us that our perceptual beliefs about physical objects must be justified qua explanations of those sensory states. Such justification requires us to have reasons to reject rival explanations, such as the skeptical hypotheses, which we lack. However, those who adopt the (...) direct realist view of perception still find these arguments plausible, although, according to this diagnosis, they shouldn’t. To avoid this objection, I argue that the Cartesian skeptical arguments exploit, not our representationalist tendencies, but our habits for evaluating causal explanatory justifications. (shrink)